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Abstract 
Stochastic general equilibrium models of small open economies with occasionally binding financial 
frictions are capable of mimicking both the business cycles and the crisis events associated with the 
sudden stop in access to credit markets (Mendoza, 2010). In this paper we study the inefficiencies 
associated with borrowing decisions in a two-sector small open production economy. We find that this 
economy is much more likely to display "under-borrowing" rather than "over-borrowing" in normal 
times. As a result, macro-prudential policies (i.e. Tobin taxes or economy-wide controls on capital 
inflows) are costly in welfare terms in our economy. Moreover, we show that macro-prudential 
policies aimed at minimizing the probability of the crisis event might be welfare-reducing in 
production economies. Our analysis shows that there is a much larger scope for welfare gains from 
policy interventions during financial crises. That is to say that, within our modeling approach, ex post 
or crisis-management policies dominate ex ante or macro-prudential ones. 
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The great recession of 2007-2009 vividly illustrated the importance of ￿nancial market im-
perfections for emerging and advanced economies alike. For emerging markets this fact is
old news as ￿nancial imperfections have long been recognized as an important source of
business cycle ￿ uctuations and crises in these countries. The great recession of 2007-2009
and the long series of crises in emerging markets beforehand have shown that ￿nancial
market imperfections result in periods in which capital market access is curtailed and ex-
penditure plans have to be adjusted suddenly. These periods￿ labelled in the literature
credit crunches and sudden stops￿ are associated with large declines in consumption, out-
put, relative prices, and asset prices.
Macroeconomic models with occasionally binding ￿nancial frictions have proven to be
capable to describe both the regular business cycle (i.e., normal times when market access
is unconstrained) and crisis events (when the market access is curtailed) (e.g., Mendoza,
2010). The distinctive feature of these models is the fact that the underlying ￿nancial
friction binds only occasionally and the crisis is an endogenous event.
The contribution of this paper is to analyzes the normative implications of this class of
models and discuss what broad set of policies will best mitigate the consequences of these
￿nancial frictions. To do so we focus on a two-sector small open economy model as in
Mendoza (2002) taking as given that it is a useful lens through which to understand the
economics of sudden stops.1
The scope for policy intervention in this class of models follows from a price externality
(or a pecuniary or credit externality) that arises because agents do not internalize the
e⁄ect of their individual decisions on a key market price entering the speci￿cation of the
￿nancial friction￿ see Arnott, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (1994) for a discussion. Because
of this externality, it has been shown that in models like the one we analyze there is the
potential for ine¢ cient borrowing to occur (e.g. Fernandez-Arias and Lombardo 1998, Uribe
2007, and Lorenzoni 2008). This ine¢ ciency is measured and quanti￿ed by comparing the
amount that individual agents borrow in the competitive equilibrium (CE) of the economy
with the amount that a social planner would choose in an economy subject to the same
occasionally binding credit constraint (SP).
By considering the role of the credit externality in a multi-sector production economy,
we ￿rst show that the direction of ine¢ cient borrowing is ambiguous (i.e. production
economies might display over or under borrowing). In our benchmark economy, however,
1Both Mendoza (2002) and Benigno Chen, Otrok, Rebucci and Young (2009) provide a detailed discus-
sion of the model. Bianchi (2010) uses an endowment version of this model.
3underborrowing is a robust feature of the competitive equilibrium allocation. From a policy
perspective, the claim that macro-prudential policies in the form of a tax on borrowing or
capital controls can restore e¢ ciency is not robust at best. In our benchmark economy,
imposing on the competitive equilibrium allocation a one percent tax on borrowing in
tranquil times is welfare-reducing. Despite reducing the probability of a crisis event to zero,
macro-prudential policies are costly as they reduce the average consumption level. Second,
we also document that the welfare gap between the social planner and the competitive
allocation is larger when the crisis occurs (i.e. when the constraint is binding) suggesting
that policy interventions during crisis times (such as bailouts or lending of last resort) are
more relevant (in welfare terms) than ex-ante ones. The policy implication is that models
that eliminate this potential source of ex post ine¢ ciency bias upward the calculation of
the welfare gains from ex ante intervention policies.
The mechanisms behind our main ￿ndings depend on the interaction between the credit
externality and the consumption and labor decisions by agents. In general agents will try
to insure against the crisis event (i.e. the possibility that the constraint becomes binding).
While in an endowment economy agents self-insure by saving more, in a production econ-
omy self-insurance occurs also through labor supply choices. The presence of the credit
externality creates a gap between the way competitive agents value consumption and pro-
duction decisions (private value) versus the way decisions are valued by the social planner
(social value) determining the possibility of ine¢ cient behavior.
The general equilibrium interaction between consumption and labor supply decisions
can be summarized in three separate e⁄ects arising from the presence of the externality:
an ￿intertemporal e⁄ect,￿a ￿production e⁄ect,￿and an ￿intrasectoral allocation e⁄ect.￿
The intertemporal e⁄ect of the externality is well known: because of the credit constraint
the marginal social value of saving (the marginal value in the social planner allocation)
is higher than the private value (in the competitive equilibrium allocation). Thus, the
intertemporal e⁄ect of the externality implies that private agents overborrow in the com-
petitive equilibrium allocation and overconsume tradable goods (see Bianchi, 2010). But,
while in endowment economies there is no other e⁄ect from the externality, in multi-sector
production economies the intertemporal allocation of consumption in￿ uences labor sup-
ply and production decisions via relative price changes. As a result, in our model, the
externality also a⁄ects the total labor supply and its sector composition or allocation.
Speci￿cally, all else being equal, via changes in relative prices, the relatively lower
private value of saving induced by the credit externality can generate a lower private value
of supplying additional labor compared to the social one. Lower private production and
consumption of domestically produced goods (both tradable and non-tradable goods) can
4then lead to lower borrowing relative to what is socially desirable, and thus generate the
possibility of underborrowing. In addition, while total labor supply tends to be lower than
socially desirable, in our multi-sector production economy, the externality also in￿ uences
the intrasectoral allocation of labor and production. In our benchmark economy, for given
total labor supply, the planner will allocate more resources towards the tradable sector
than private agents. As a result, the planner will produce and consume less non-tradable
goods than private agents, implying lower tradable consumption and higher saving in the
social planner allocation relative to the competitive equilibrium. The relative tilt in the
socially desirable allocation of labor towards tradable production will then tend to reinforce
overborrowing in the competitive equilibrium of the model.
The net result of these three e⁄ects determine whether in equilibrium the model econ-
omy displays over- or underborrowing. In our baseline calibration, the sum of these three
contrasting forces results in underborrowing in equilibrium. More generally though, this
general equilibrium interactions suggest that the relative strength of these e⁄ects create
ambiguity in the direction of the ine¢ cient borrowing. In our analysis, these mechanisms
on the production side of the economy are robust to a variety of model speci￿cations, in
which the collateral constraint is speci￿ed in terms of asset prices rather than relative price
of nontradables or the presence of working capital constraint.
Our welfare analysis shows the importance of focusing on the e⁄ects of credit externality
in production economies. Di⁄erently from the endowment case, the planner can a⁄ect the
value of the collateral by altering the production mix and the relative prices: this creates
a gap between the competitive and the planner allocation also in crisis times. Given an
overall welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP allocation, which is about 0.12 percent
of permanent consumption, we ￿nd that these gains increase by about 25 percent to 0.15
percent if we focus only on the crisis states. Thus, while our ￿underborrowing￿ result
implies that borrowing should be subsidized rather than taxed in both good and bad times,
our welfare analysis shows that intervening in crisis times is more important than in normal
times. More generally, our result implies that the welfare gains of policy intervention during
a crisis is greater than outside those periods, suggesting that ex-post policies are likely to
be more important than ex-ante ones in this class of models.
A set of related studies has examined the policy implications of the same credit external-
ity we focus on in this paper. Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2010) use endowment versions
of the economy we study and ￿nd that individual agents in the CE borrow more than in
the SP (i.e., they overborrow) and advocate the use of macro-prudential policies (or more
generally ex-ante intervention policies) in the form of a tax on international borrowing or
economy-wide capital controls as a way to restore e¢ ciency. Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and
5Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) analyze models in which the price externality arises because
agents fail to internalize the e⁄ect of their decisions on an asset price rather than the rela-
tive price of non-tradable goods like in our model. Their analysis and policy conclusions are
similar to those of Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2010). All these model economies exhibit
overborrowing and an ex ante intervention policy is the proper tool to restore e¢ ciency. In
addition, these models are such that ex post intervention policies such as bailouts or any
lending of last resort have no scope. This is because, by assumption, in crisis periods, the
CE and SP allocations cannot di⁄er when the credit constraint binds in these models.2
The model that we use in this paper is standard, except for the occasionally binding
credit constraint. The occasionally binding credit constraint is embedded in a two-sector
(tradable and non-tradable good) small open economy in which ￿nancial markets are not
only incomplete but also imperfect, as in Mendoza (2002). The asset menu is restricted to a
one period risk-free bond paying o⁄the exogenously given foreign interest rate. In addition
to asset market incompleteness, we assume that access to foreign ￿nancing is constrained
to a fraction of households￿total income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-sector produc-
tion model we use and explains the working of the credit externality in this set up. Section
3 discusses its solution, parametrization and performance. Section 4 compares the CE and
the SP equilibria of the baseline model economy we study, discusses the robustness of the
main ￿ndings of the numerical analysis, and quanti￿es the welfare gains or costs of tobin
taxes in this model set up. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model that we use is a simple two-sector (tradable and non-tradable) small open
economy, in which ￿nancial markets are not only incomplete but also imperfect like in
Mendoza (2010), and in which production occurs in both sectors.
2.1 Households




















2See Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the related
literature and a quantitative comparison between production and endowment economies.
6with Cj denoting the individual consumption basket and Hj the individual supply of labor
for the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors (Hj = HT
j + HN
j ). The assumption of perfect
substitutability between labor services in the two sectors insures that there is a unique labor
market. For simplicity we omit the j subscript for the remainder of this section, but it is
understood that all choices are made at the individual level. The elasticity of labor supply
is ￿, while ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. In (1), the preference speci￿cation
follows from Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (GHH, 1988). In the context of a one-
good economy this speci￿cation eliminates the wealth e⁄ect from the labor supply choice.
Here it is important to emphasize that in a multi-good economy, the sectoral allocation of
consumption will a⁄ect the labor supply decision through relative prices.






















The parameter ￿ is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of
tradable and nontradable goods, while ! is the relative weight of tradable goods in the
consumption basket. We normalize the price of traded goods to 1. The relative price of the
nontradable good is denoted P N. The aggregate price index is then given by
Pt =
h








where we note that there is a one to one link between the aggregate price index P and the
relative price P N:
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, which is expressed in







t = ￿t + WtHt ￿ Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt; (3)
where Wt is the wage in units of tradable goods, Bt+1 denotes the net foreign asset position
at the end of period t with gross real return 1 + i. Households receive pro￿ts, ￿t, from
owning the representative ￿rm. Their labor income is given by WtHt.
International ￿nancial markets are incomplete and access to them is also imperfect. The
asset menu includes only a one-period bond denominated in units of tradable consumption.
In addition, we assume that the amount that each individual can borrow internationally is




[￿t + WtHt]: (4)
This constraint captures a balance sheet e⁄ect (e.g., Krugman (1999) and Aghion, Bacchetta
and Banerjee (2004)) since foreign borrowing is denominated in units of tradables while the
income that can be pledged as collateral is generated also in the non-tradable sector. The
value of the collateral is endogenous in this model as it depends on the current realization
of pro￿ts and wage income. We don￿ t derive explicitly the credit constraint as the outcome
of an optimal contract between lenders and borrowers. However, we can interpret this
constraint as the outcome of an interaction between lenders and borrowers in which the
lenders is not willing to permit borrowing beyond a certain limit.3 This limit depends on
the parameter ￿ that measures the tightness of the borrowing constraint and it depends on
current income that could be used as a proxy of future income.4
Households maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CN
t ;CT
t , Bt+1, and Ht. The




























































where ￿t is the multiplier on the period budget constraint and ￿t is the multiplier on the
international borrowing constraint. When the credit constraint is binding (￿t > 0), the
Euler equation (7) incorporates an e⁄ect that can be interpreted as arising from a country-
3As emphasized by Arellano and Mendoza (2003), this form of liquidity constraint shares some features,
namely the endogeneity of the risk premium, that would be the outcome of the interaction between a risk-
averse borrower and a risk-neutral lender in a contracting framework as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). It
is also consistent with anecdotal evidence on lending criteria and guidelines used in mortgage and consumer
￿nancing.
4As we discuss in Benigno et al. (2009), a constraint expressed in terms of future income which could be
the outcome of the interaction between lenders and borrowers in a limited commitment environment would
introduce further computational di¢ culties that we need to avoid for tractability since future consumption
choices a⁄ect current borrowing decisions.
8speci￿c risk premium on external ￿nancing. In this framework, even if the constraint is
not binding at time t; there is an intertemporal e⁄ect coming from the possibility that the





which implies that current consumption of tradeable goods would be lower compared to an
economy in which access to foreign borrowing is unconstrained.
From the previous conditions, we can combine (5) and (6) to obtain the intratemporal



























































If we were in a one good economy model, there would be no e⁄ect coming from the marginal
utility of consumption on the labour supply choice because of the GHH preference speci￿-





￿, and the labor
supply curve becomes steeper as PN falls.5 Note also that, when the constraint is binding
(￿t > 0), the marginal utility of supplying one more unit of labor is higher, and this helps to
relax the constraint: when ￿t > 0, the labor supply becomes steeper and agents substitute
leisure with labor to increase the value of their collateral for given wages and prices. Given
that PN falls when the constraint is binding, these two e⁄ects imply an increase in labor
supply for given wages in the constrained region.
Importantly, the labor supply is also a⁄ected by the possibility that the constraint may
be binding in the future. If in period t the constraint is not binding but it may bind in













￿t = ￿ (1 + i)Et
￿





so that the marginal bene￿t of supplying one more unit of labor today is higher, the higher
5In what follows, we refer to the labor supply curve in a diagram in which labor is on the vertical axis
and the wage rate on the horizontal one.
9is the probability that the constraint will be binding in the future. This e⁄ect will induce
agents to supply more labor for any given wage, and again the labor supply curve will
be steeper relative to the case in which there is no credit constraint. For given wages
then, this e⁄ect tend to increase the level of non-tradable production and consumption and
a⁄ects tradable consumption depending on the substitutability between tradable and non-
tradable goods. When goods are complements, the increases in nontradable consumption is
associated with an increase in tradable consumption that reduces the amount agents save
in the competitive equilibrium. The opposite would occur if goods were substitute.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce tradables and non-tradables goods with a variable labor input and decreasing















where AN and AT are the productivity levels that are assumed to be random variables
in the non-tradables and tradables sector respectively. The ￿rm￿ s problem is static and

















































so that the value of the marginal product of labor equals the wage in units of tradable
















from which we note that the relative price of non-tradable goods determines the allocation
of labor between the two sectors. For given productivity levels, a fall in P N
t drives down the
marginal product of non-tradable and induces a shift of labor toward the tradable sector.
102.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
2.3.1 Labor Market Equilibrium in a two-sector production economy
The distinguishing and novel feature of our two-sector production economy is the implica-
tion of sector labor allocation for precautionary saving behavior.
To analyze our mechanism, we characterize the labor market equilibrium and the sector







































































































with H = HT + HN: The system of equations (14)-(16) determines Ht, P N
t ; HN
t for given
consumption of tradables CT
t ; productivity levels in the two sector (i.e. AN
t and AT
t ),
and the possibility that the constraint is binding, ￿t:6 When the constraint is not binding
(i.e., ￿t = 0 ), (14), (15) and (16) determine the labor market equilibrium along with the
relative prices, while changes in equilibrium CT
t capture the e⁄ect of the possibility that
the constraint might be binding in the future.7
The general equilibrium interaction of labor market equilibrium, relative price of non-
tradable goods, and precautionary saving is complex in our two-sector production economy.
This interaction can generate, in equilibrium, stronger precautionary saving than a one
6In the appendix we determine the sign of the response to total labor supply, the demand of non-tradable
and tradable labor and the relative price of non-tradable for a given change in CT:
7As we explained above, when ￿t = 0 agents will save more compared to the unconstrained economy as
they take into account the possibility that the constraint might bind in the future.
11sector production economy or endowment economies.
As in the two-sector endowment economy, lower tradable consumption for precautionary
saving reason leads to a decline in the relative price of non-tradable. For given wages,
the decline in the relative price of non-tradable will induce changes in labor supply and
production decisions that eventually have implications for the saving behavior. While total
labor supply always increases, because of the income e⁄ect generated by the relative price
change, the associated sector reallocation of labor implies a decline in non-tradable labor
that, in equilibrium, tends to increase the relative price of non-tradable goods. If goods are
complements, as we assume in the model calibration, the ensuing decline in non-tradable
consumption might induce agents to save even more compared to the endowment economy,
and hence amplify the precautionary saving e⁄ect coming from the possibility of a binding
borrowing constraint in the future.
The magni￿cation of the precautionary saving e⁄ect of a possibly binding borrowing con-
straint is a property of a two-sector production economy and does not depend on the way the
borrowing constraint is speci￿ed. In a one-sector production economy with endogenous la-







and the labor supply schedule would be a⁄ected by consumption choices. 8
The mechanism induced by the two-sector production structure is also robust to the
way the collateral constraint is speci￿ed. If we add land to the model and express the
collateral constraint in terms of land price (like in Jeanne and Korinek (2009) or Bianchi
and Mendoza (2010)) the labor supply and intrasectoral reallocation e⁄ects would still
operate. This mechanism would also survive in the context in which there is a working
capital constraint like in Bianchi and Mendoza (2010): as long as the constraint is not
binding, the labor market equilibrium conditions would be identical to the one proposed
here ((14), (15) and (16) (with ￿t = 0 )).
2.3.2 Goods Market Equilibrium Conditions
To determine the good market equilibrium, combine the household budget constraint and
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts with the equilibrium condition in the nontradable good market to obtain







t ￿ Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt: (17)






= Wt and labor supply
would be independent of the consumption choices.














Finally, using the de￿nitions of ￿rm pro￿ts and wages, the credit constraint implies that
the amount that the country, as a whole, can borrow is constrained by a fraction of the














so that (17) and (19) determines the evolution of the foreign borrowing.
2.4 Social Planner Problem
We now focus on the social planner￿ s problem. The planner maximizes (1) subject to
the resource constraints (17) and (18), the international borrowing constraint from an
aggregate perspective (19), and the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium allocation.
By constraining the social planner problem to the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium
allocation we follow Kehoe and Levine (2003) in the characterization of the constrained
e¢ cient outcome. Another possibility would be to use the concept of conditional e¢ ciency in
which the planner problem is constrained by the competitive equilibrium pricing function in
which P N




t ). Here in the constrained e¢ cient case we note that the relative







































t ; and the























































￿ = ￿2;t; (22)





























































































where ￿1;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (17), ￿2;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (18) and ￿t
is the multiplier on (20).
There are two main di⁄erences between the competitive equilibrium ￿rst order condi-
tions and those of the planner￿ s problem introduced by the presence of the occasionally
binding borrowing constraint. First, equation (21) shows that, in choosing tradable con-
sumption, the planner takes into account the e⁄ects that a change in tradable consumption
has on the value of the collateral (see also Korinek, 2010 and Bianchi, 2009). This is what
is usually referred as the "pecuniary externality" in the related literature and it occurs
when the constraint is binding (i.e. ￿t > 0). As we noted above, however, even if the
constraint is not binding today, the possibility that it might bind in the future can a⁄ect
the marginal value of tradable consumption today (i.e. the marginal value of saving). The
Euler equation from the planner perspective becomes
￿1;t = ￿ (1 + i)Et
￿








is given by (21) and takes into account the future e⁄ect of the pecuniary
externality. This crucially implies that, at the same allocation, the marginal social value
of saving (the marginal value in the SP allocation), through this e⁄ect, will be higher than
the private value (in the CE allocation). Thus, the decentralized equilibrium might display
overborrowing. This e⁄ect of the price externality is common in economies in which the
collateral constraint is expressed in terms of a relative price (see Benigno et al. (2010)).
A di⁄erent e⁄ect would arise in an economy in which the price externality is modelled
through the presence of an asset price in the credit constraint (e.g., when the value of an
asset serves as a collateral rather than income). Because of the forward looking nature of
asset prices, the planner takes also into account the e⁄ect of its consumption choices on
14asset prices through their e⁄ects on the stochastic discount factor. This e⁄ect might induce
a higher increase in tradable consumption in the social planner allocation and go in the
opposite direction of the price externality one.
In the production economy that we study, the presence of the occasionally binding
borrowing constraint generate an additional mechanism. To see this, we can rewrite the































and rewrite the non tradable labor supply equation by using (22) and the equilibrium
























































These expression shows that, when the constraint is binding, the social marginal utility of
supplying one extra unit of tradable labor is always positive, while the social marginal value
of supplying one extra unit of non-tradables labor depends on the degree of substitutability
between tradable and non-tradable goods. When goods are substitutes and the borrowing
constraint is binding, the planner always supplies one more unit of non-tradable labor for
given marginal product of labor, as that helps in relaxing the constraint. However, when
goods are complements, the planner decreases the amount of non-tradable labor supplied
at the margin.
Note here that there is an e⁄ect on labor supply also when the constraint is not binding
(￿t = 0). To see this, note that the labor market equilibrium is determined by the following


























We can then rewrite the non tradable labor supply equation by using (22) and the equilib-






























The system of equations given by (26), (27) and (28) determines total labor supply and the
sectoral allocation of labor for given CT; AT
t and AN
t :
There are two e⁄ects in our production economy coming from the possibility that the
constraint might bind in the future. The ￿rst one is on total labor supply, while the second
is on the substitution between tradable and non-tradable labor (intratemporal labor real-
location e⁄ect). Both e⁄ects are induced by the fact that, in the social planner allocation,
current marginal utility of tradable consumption is higher compared to the competitive
equilibrium allocation. Higher current marginal utility of tradable consumption increases
the marginal utility of supplying one unit of labor today. As a result, in the social plan-
ner allocation, labor supply is higher compared to the CE even when the constraint is not
binding. This e⁄ect alone can cause underborrowing in equilibrium.
The second e⁄ect depends on the intrasectoral labor allocation. Higher current marginal
utility of tradable consumption (i.e. ￿1;t) in the SP implies that, for given total labor
supply, the planner will shift resources towards the tradable sector. This shift will reduce
the production and the consumption of non-tradable goods. When goods are complement
this reduction in the consumption of non-tradable consumption will also imply a reduction
in tradable consumption, and hence increasing the amount agents save in the SP allocation
relative to the CE allocation. The shift of labor towards tradable production then will tend
to strengthen overborrowing in the competitive allocation compared to the social planner
one.9 When goods are substitutes, the decline in non-tradable consumption leads to an
9It is possible to see the e⁄ect on total labor supply by combining (25) and (24) when the constraint is
















































































16increase in tradable consumption and as such to a decrease in the amount agents save in
the SP allocation compared to the CE allocation. Under substitutability sectoral allocation
of labor might induce underborrowing in the competitive equilibrium allocation. Note ￿nally
that, in equilibrium, sector re-allocation will have a further feedback e⁄ect on total labor
supply by a⁄ecting wages in units of tradable.
In contrast to what we discussed for the competitive equilibrium, the speci￿cation of
the borrowing constraint has implications for the characterization of the social planner
allocation. While the production/labor supply choice are independent from the way the
constraint is speci￿ed (equations (26), (27) and (28) will remain the same), the intertem-
poral consumption pattern is a⁄ected by the way the planner manipulates the stochastic
discount factor when the borrowing constraint is speci￿ed in terms of asset prices.10 Con-
sider the following experiment in which the planner decreases future consumption while
increasing current consumption: by doing so, the planner increases the pricing kernel and
in￿ ate asset prices. When the incentive of the planner to manipulate the intertemporal
consumption pattern dominates, marginal utility of tradable consumption today is lower
than in the competitive equilibrium the possibility of underborrowing arises.
In the papers by Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Korinek and Jeanne (2010) this
e⁄ect is not present despite the fact that they consider economies in which the borrowing
constraint depend on a key asset price. Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) don￿ t have this e⁄ect
because to solve for the social planner problem they use the concept of conditional e¢ ciency
(i.e. they assume that the asset price is determined by the asset price function that links
current asset price to the exogenous and endogenous state variables). By construction then
the planner cannot in￿ uence the intertemporal path of consumption. 11
3 Solution methods, parameter values, and model eval-
uation
In this section we describe the global solution methods that we use to compute the com-
petitive and the social planner equilibrium of the model. We then discuss the parameter
values chosen and the model￿ s ability to ￿t the data for a typical emerging market economy
10The following reasoning is based on characterizing the constrained e¢ cient social planner problem as in
Kehoe and Levine (1993) so that the equilibrium condition that determines asset prices in the competitive
allocation is taken as a constraint of the social planner problem.
11Using the concept of conditional e¢ ciency has implications also for the behavior of the economy in
the binding region. When the amount of borrowing is constrained, conditional e¢ ciency eliminates the




The competitive equilibrium problem is given by equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11),
(12), (17) and (18) above. The algorithm for the solution of the competitive equilibrium
of the model is derived from Baxter (1990) and Coleman (1989), and involves iterating on
the functional equations that characterize a recursive competitive equilibrium in the states
￿
B;AT￿
. The key step is the transformation of the complementary slackness conditions on
the borrowing constraint into a set of nonlinear equations that can be solved using standard
solvers (in particular, a modi￿ed Powell￿ s method). The key steps are to replace the La-
grange multiplier, ￿t, with the expression maxf￿
￿
t;0g





























































































. This solution is used to update the G￿ function to convergence.
Note that if the constraint binds, ￿
￿




Given the solution for the equilibrium decision rules, we can compute the equilibrium






















































which de￿nes a contraction mapping and thus has a unique solution.13
12Note also that ￿t = maxf￿
￿
t;0g
2 ￿ 0, maxf￿￿
￿
t;0g






2 = 0 so the
complementary slackness conditions are satis￿ed.
13This functional equation gives us lifetime utility only in equilibrium. To obtain lifetime utility outside



























































subject to the resource constraints, the borrowing constraint, and the marginal condition
that determines P N:
C
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We approximate the function V SP using cubic splines, and solve the maximization using
feasible sequential quadratic programming.






























































is the lifetime utility experienced using the competitive equilibrium
decision rules with an extra ￿ percent of tradable consumption given freely to the repre-
sentative household. This functional equation de￿nes a contraction mapping, so it has a



















equilibrium, we would need to solve the household problem separating individual debt b from aggregate
debt B.
14The rank among allocation would not change if we express the welfare gain and losses as a percent of
overall consumption.
19which yields the percent increase in tradable consumption that renders the representative
agent indi⁄erent between the competitive equilibrium and the social planning allocation
state-by-state.
Note that the algorithm to solve the competitive equilibrium of the model can in prin-
ciple be implemented with more exogenous or endogenous states in the competitive equi-
librium. However, the algorithm to compute the SP limits our analysis to one endogenous
state. To solve the dynamic program in the SP we need to preserve the shape of V SP, and
this is only possible in one dimension. As the main purpose of the analysis is comparing
the two allocations, this constrains the degree of complexity of the model we can analyze.
3.2 Parameter values
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency on Mexico data. There are several reasons to
focus on Mexico. First Mexico is a representative emerging market economy whose experi-
ence is particularly relevant for the main issue addressed in the paper. Mexico experienced
three major episodes of international capital ￿ ows reversals since 1980 that are unambigu-
ously regarded as typical examples of sudden stops: the ￿rst one leading to the 1982 debt
crisis; the second one, the well known ￿Tequila crisis￿in 1994-1995; and the third one in
2008-09 during the global ￿nancial crisis that led Mexico to seek (or accept) IMF ￿nancial
assistance. Second, Mexico is a well functioning, relatively large, market-based economy in
which production in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors of the economy goes well
beyond the extraction of natural resources such as oil or other commodities. Third, there is
a substantial body of previous quantitative work on Mexico, starting from Mendoza (1991),
which greatly facilitates the choice of the parameter values of the model. In particular,
we choose model parameters following the work of Mendoza (2002, 2010) and Kehoe and
Ruhl (2008) to the extent possible, and use available data where necessary to complement
or update this previous work.
The speci￿c set of parameter values that we use in our baseline calibration are reported
in Table 1. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to standard value of ￿ = 2,
like in Mendoza (2002, 2010). We set then the world interest rate to i = 0:01587, which
yields an annual real rate of interest of about 6.5 percent like in Mendoza (2002): a value
that is between the 5 percent of Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and the 8.6 percent of Mendoza
(2010).
The elasticity of intratemporal substitution in consumption between tradables and non-
tradables is an important parameter in the analysis as we discussed in the previous section.
But there is a good degree of consensus in the literature on its value. We follow Ostry
20and Reinhart (1992), who estimates a value of ￿ = 0:760 for developing countries. This is
a conservative assumption compared to the value of 0:5 used by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008)
closer to the one assumed for an advanced, more closed economy like the United States.
Estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply in Mexico are uncertain at best (Men-
doza, 2002 and 2010). We set the value of ￿ = 2, as in Mendoza (2002), close to the value
of 1:84 adopted by Mendoza (2010).
The labor share of income, (1￿￿T) and (1￿￿N) is set to 0.66 in both tradable and non
tradable sectors: a standard value, close to that used by Mendoza (2002), and consistent
with empirical evidence on the aggregate share of labor income in GDP in household survey
of Garcia-Verdu (2005).














where "t is an iid N(0;￿2
A) innovation. The parameters of this process are set to ￿A = 0:537
and ￿A = 0:0134 which are the ￿rst autocorrelation and the standard deviation of aggregate
total factor productivity reported by Mendoza (2010). Both the average value of AT and
the constant AN are set to one.
The remaining three model parameters￿ the share of tradable consumption in the con-
sumption basket (!), the credit constraint parameter (￿), and the discount factor (￿)￿ are
set by iterating on a routine that minimizes the sum of squared di⁄erences between the
moments in the ergodic distribution of the competitive equilibrium of the model and three
data targets. The data targets are a CN=CT ratio of 1.643, a 35 percent debt-to-GDP ratio,
and an unconditional probability of sudden stop of 2 percent per quarter. This CN=CT ratio
is the value implied by the following ratios estimated by Mendoza (2002): Y T=Y N =0.648,
CT=Y T =0.665; and CN=Y N =0.708 as in Mendoza (2002).15 The debt-to-GDP target is
Mexico￿ s average net foreign asset to annual GDP ratio, from 1970 to 2008, in the updated
version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) data set.
The target for the unconditional probability of sudden stop is more di¢ cult to pin down.
Despite a signi￿cant body of empirical work on identifying sudden stops in emerging markets
to describe the macroeconomic dynamics around these events, there is no consensus in the
literature on how to de￿ne sudden stops empirically, and hence no accepted measure of the
unconditional probability of these events. By focusing on Mexico, we can pin down this
target simply and unambiguously, measuring it as the relative frequency, on a quarterly
15Ratios computed with updated data are essentially the same. As we evaluate the model￿ s ability to
replicate the 1995 Tequila crisis we use the exact values reported by Mendoza (2002).
21basis, of Mexico￿ s sudden stops years over the period 1975-2010. This assumes that, as
generally accepted, 1982, 1995, and 2009 were sudden stop years for Mexico. The resulting
2 percent is very close to the 1.9 percent implied by the empirical analysis of Jeanne and
Ranciere (2010) over the period 1975-2003, who use an ￿absolute￿de￿nition of sudden stops
as current account reversals larger than 5 percent of GDP. Our number is also similar to the
2.2 percent value implied by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2008) for the period 1990-2004,
based on a ￿relative￿de￿nition of sudden stops as current account reversals larger than
two standard deviations. The two percent value, however, is at the low-end of the range of
values estimated in these studies by pooling data for the whole sample of emerging markets
considered.
In order to contrast Mexico data with model outcomes during sudden stop episodes,
consistent with both the model and the empirical literature above, we de￿ne a sudden stop
in the model as an event in which: (a) ￿t > 0 (i.e. the international borrowing constraint
is binding) and (b) (Bt+1 ￿Bt) > 2￿(Bt+1 ￿Bt) (i.e. the current account or changes in the
net foreign asset position in a given period exceed two times its standard deviation). The
￿rst criterion is a purely model based de￿nition sudden stop. The second criterion allows
us to consider only model events in which there are large current account reversals, in line
with the aforementioned empirical literature.16 17
With the targets above we obtain ! = 0:3526; ￿ = 0:9717, and ￿ = 0:415. The implied
value of ! is slightly higher than in Mendoza (2002) and slightly lower than targeted by
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008). The implied annual value of ￿ is yield an annual discount factor of
0.8915, only slightly lower than in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008).18 The implied value of ￿ is lower
than in Mendoza (2002), who however calibrates it to the deterministic steady state of the
model, and there are no standard benchmarks for this model parameter in the literature.
16The de￿nition of sudden stop typically used in the empirical literature focuses on large capital ￿ ows
reversals because some smaller ones may be due to terms of trade changes or other factors Jeanne and
Ranciere (forthcoming), for instance, excludes commodity importers and oil producers, while Calvo et al.
(DATE) add other criteria to the second one we use above.
17Note that national accounts data typically have a trend, and hence the empirical literature focuses
changes in the current account, or the ￿rst di⁄erence of the capital ￿ ows. As our model has no trend
growth and the data are in percent deviation from HP ￿lter, we focus on the current account rather than
its change. We obtain similar results when we de￿ne the sudden stop with respect to changes in the current
acocunt.
18This value is not comparable to the one assumed by Mendoza (2002) as he uses an endogenous discount
factor speci￿cation. In our model, the presence of the borrowing constraint removes the necessity to
introduce any device to induce a stationary ergodic distribution of foreign borrowing.
223.3 Model evaluation
The class of models we study is potentially capable of describing well both the cycle and
the crisis periods of an emerging market economy like Mexico (Mendoza, 2010). However,
in our implementation of the model, we shut down a number of shocks used in other work
and focus on the mechanisms driving our policy results. With our one shock we clearly
cannot match all the moments of the data that this class of models is capable of replicating.
Nonetheless, it is useful to see how well our one shock model does do in describing both the
business cycle and the dynamics around a typical sudden stop event, as the ￿rst exercise is
standard and helps to understand the ￿ndings in the second one.
To conduct this comparison we use the variable as de￿ned in Table 2. All data variables
are reported in percent deviations from HP ￿ltered trend (over the 1993Q1-2007Q4 period)
except the current account, which is reported as a share of GDP. All model variables are
reported in percent deviation from ergodic mean except the current account that is reported,
as in the data, as a share of GDP. To calculate model moments we simulate the model for
1,000,000 time periods, and retain the ￿nal 10,000 simulation periods to calculate moments
and identify sudden stop events.
Table 3 reports data and simulated second moments. Despite its simplicity, the model
describes the data reasonably well except for the behavior of the tradable GDP that is
counterfactual because of the behavior of labor supply when the constraint is binding in
our model economy. As we can see, once we normalize all standard deviations relative
to GDP in units of tradable goods (as in Bianchi, 2010), the model roughly matches the
ranking of the data volatilities consistent with the results in Mendoza (2002), despite the
fact that the model has only one shock. In particular, the model generates consumption
volatility that is almost as high as GDP volatility and a current account that is less volatile
that aggregate GDP or its components. The model however produces higher relative price
volatility and too low tradable GDP volatility relative to the data (i.e. relative to GDP
volatility).19 Like in the data, all model variables are similarly persistent, but less than in
the data (especially for the relative price on non-tradable goods and tradable GDP). All
correlations with GDP except the relative price one are also all roughly consistent with
the data. The correlation between CA and GDP is positive contrary to what we observe
in the data. This is because, as calibrated to Mexican data, the constraint does not alter
consumption smoothing enough in the ergodic distribution of our model to generate such
negative correlation.20 Note in addition that, the correlation between CA and net income
19Note that, using data up to 2007, as we do, the absolute value of consumption volatility in the data is
much lower than reported by Mendoza (2002), and hence much closer to GDP volatility.
20For instance, Bianchi (2010) obtain a negative correlation calibrating the model to Argentine data with
23(de￿ned as GDP minus investment and government expenditure, and hence closer to our
model de￿nition) may be either slightly positive or zero in the average emerging market
economy (Luo, Nie, and Young, 2010). Indeed, as it is well known (Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland, 1994), a model with investment would generate a negative correlation.
Similar strengths and weaknesses emerge by comparing the macroeconomic dynamics
around a typical sudden stop event. For this comparison, we focus on the 1995 Tequila crisis,
the same episode studied by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and Mendoza (2010). Speci￿cally,
Figure 1 compares the model and the Mexican data for key variables four quarters before
and after 1995Q1, where the model variables are average across the identi￿ed sudden stop
episodes, four periods before and four periods after our sudden stop de￿nition is initially
met.21
As we can see from Figure 1, the model qualitatively reproduces the large declines in
expenditure on consumption and output (both expressed in units of tradable goods), and
the relative price of tradable during the 1995 Tequila crisis in Mexico. However in the
model this relative price decline is less persistent than in the data. Similarly, qualitatively,
non tradable output and expenditure on non-tradable consumption measured in units of
tradables are described relatively well by the model. The same lack of persistence charac-
terizes all model variables that generally recover much faster than in the data. We note
also that consumption expenditure falls much more than output in our model economy
since, in the model, tradable output increases in sudden stop. Consistent with the data,
tradable GDP also starts to fall sharply before the sudden stops, but it increases during
the sudden stop period, counterfactually. As a result, tradable consumption falls much less
than non-tradable consumption, while in the data the opposite occurs.
Quantitatively, however, the model produces a sudden stop dynamics of amplitude
roughly one-order of magnitude smaller than in the data. This occurs for two reasons.
First, as we noted above, the model is too simple to provide an accurate quantitative ac-
count of the data: in particular we limit ourselves to only one shock in tradable productivity
while other shocks (for example foreign interest rate shocks) might have contributed in am-
plifying the dynamic of the economy during sudden stop. Second, and more importantly,
the model counterfactually predicts an increase in total employment at the sudden stop,
driven by a sharp increase in labor supply and fall in the real wage (not reported).
As Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) discuss there are three ways to generate a falling employ-
very high shock variance and low discount factor.
21As it is evident in the capital ￿ ow data (not reported), while capital ￿ ows into Mexico started to revert
in the fourth quarter of 1994, they were initially accommodated by a very large decrease in o¢ cial reserves
that eventually lead to collapse of the ￿xed exchange rate regime in December 1994. As a result, the current
account started to revert only in 1995Q1.
24ment in the model: a friction in the labor mobility across sectors, variable capital utilization,
and a working capital constraint, but none produces satisfactory account of labor market
dynamics during the Tequila crisis in their model. In addition, in our model they pose
additional complications. Imperfect labor mobility and variable capital utilization intro-
duce an additional state variable. But, as we noted earlier, the comparison between the
competitive and the social planner allocation that is the focus of the paper constrains the
number of endogenous state variable that can feature in our model. A working capital
constraint could produce falling output, but would complicates the speci￿cation of the bor-
rowing constraint. In addition a working capital constraint would generate output falling
at the sudden stop, but would not alter the underlying mechanism at work in the region in
which we examine ine¢ cient borrowing (i.e. during tranquil times) so that our discussion
on the role of macro-prudential policies would be robust to this change. For these reasons,
at ￿rst pass, we prefer to keep the model simple.
4 Ine¢ cient borrowing and macro-prudential policies
In this section we report and discuss a comparison between the competitive equilibrium
allocation and the social planner one based on a full numerical solution of our two-sector,
production model. In this section, we also discuss the robustness of the analysis to changes
in key parameter values and its policy implications for the debate on macro-prudential
policies.22
4.1 Comparing CE and SP allocations
The policy function for foreign borrowing, Bt+1, is plotted in Figure 2, conditional on a
particular state of the tradable shock. The decision rules are drawn assuming this shock
is received in each period. The continuos line refers to the competitive equilibrium (CE)
allocation while the dotted line refers to the social planner one (SP). The Figure shows that
there is a small underborrowing when the constraint is not binding and a much larger one
when the constraint binds￿ i.e., for each value of the endogenous state Bt, Bt+1 is smaller
in the CE than in the SP throughout the support of the decision rule. This result shows
that, in our model, in which there is scope for both ex ante and ex post ine¢ ciencies, the
latter are quantitatively much larger than the former.
These ￿ndings are in sharp contrast with those in the related literature￿ Bianchi (2010),
22The properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy are well known (see for instance Mendoza,
2002), and are fully discussed in Benigno et al (2009 and 2010).
25Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Korinek and Jeanne (2010). The literature, has focused
only on ex ante ine¢ ciencies (i.e., when the constraint does not bind) in models in which ex
post e¢ ciencies does not arise. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that in a model in which both
ex ante and ex post e¢ ciencies can arise, the ex ante ine¢ ciency found is not only smaller
than the ex post one, but it also goes in the opposite direction. Note that the borrowing
ine¢ ciency that we document in our benchmark economy calls for both ex ante and ex post
policy intervention geared toward inducing more rather than less borrowing than private
agents choose to take on, both before and after the constraint binds.
Figures 3 and 4 report the policy functions for the other key variables of the model as
a function of the endogenous state, Bt. The policy functions are drawn for the continued
realization of the same shock. All variables (P N
t , Wt, HT
t , HN
t and Ht, CT
t , CN
t and Ct)
follow a similar pattern in both allocations displaying a kink in correspondence of the state
in which the constraint becomes binding.23 As the economy moves toward the binding
region, agents (and the planner) increase the amount they want to borrow and reduce
their tradable and non-tradable consumption (Figure 4). In this transition, before the
constraint binds, the relative price of non-tradable falls in both the competitive and the
social planner allocation. Note though, that the relative price of non-tradable goods in
the SP allocation is higher compared to the CE allocation in the non-binding region as
the social planner consumes relatively more of tradable (i.e. borrows more in equilibrium)
in normal times. As we discussed above, in our two-sector production economy, there is
an additional e⁄ect coming from the intrasectoral labor allocation on precautionary saving
when goods are complement so that in our competitive allocation consumption of tradable
goods is further reduced in normal times. Since the relative price of non-tradables is lower
in the CE allocation compared to the SP one, the sector allocation of labor (see equation
(13)) is such that in the CE there is overproduction of tradables and under-production of
non-tradables relative to the SP (Figure 4).
Once the constraint binds we observe two important di⁄erences between the CE alloca-
tion and the SP one. First, as already noted, the di⁄erences between the decision rules of
the CE and the SP are much larger than in "normal times". Second, the SP engineers an
increase in P N
t accompanied with a decrease in non-tradable production, while in the CE
allocation the relative price decreases and non-tradable production rises.
These di⁄erences arises because of the way the planner deals with the constraint com-
pared to how private agents do. In our production economy, increasing the value of the
23Note that the kink of the decision rules in the SP occurs at a higher level of Bt than in the CE because
the SP borrow more on average than the CE. As we shall see below, however, this does not mean that
the SP is more constrained than the CE since the lower bound on debt is determined by the intersection
between the policy functions for each state with the 45 degree line at di⁄erent.
26collateral in units of tradable could occur by increasing the production of tradables and/or
by increasing the value of non-tradable production. As the social planner takes into account
the impact of its consumption and production decisions on the relative price of non-tradable
goods, it increases the value of collateral by increasing this price (and hence the value of
non-tradable production in units of tradable goods) rather than by increasing the amount
of non-tradable goods produced. In the SP allocation, a combination of relatively higher
consumption of tradables (i.e. more borrowing) and lower consumption of non-tradables
(i.e. by reducing the production of non-tradables) leads to an increase in the relative price.
The SP also increases the production of tradable goods but less so than in the CE allocation
so that total labor supply rises but less than in the CE allocation. Private agents on the
other hand tend to increase their borrowing capacity by producing more of both tradables
and non-tradables. In doing so they do not internalize the e⁄ects of their production de-
cisions on the relative price of non-tradable goods, and in equilibrium we observe a lower
relative prices that tends to further tighten the constraint.
Figure 5, compares the ergodic distributions of foreign borrowing in the CE and the
SP allocation. The Figure shows the under-borrowing that characterizes our benchmark
economy, as the CE distribution is located to the right of the SP one. Nonetheless, the
mean debt-to-GDP ration of these two distributions is the same (i.e., 35 percent), with only
slightly smaller average debt in the CE than in the SP (-0.914 and -0.941 in the CE and
the SP, respectively).24
Despite having the same mean, the shape of these two distributions is very di⁄erent.
The shape of the borrowing distribution depends on the location of the intersection of
the policy function at di⁄erent values of the exogenous state with the 45 degree line (not
reported), which in turn depends on the shape of policy function itself. In the SP, these
intersections occur on a more dispersed portion of the distribution￿ s support. As a result,
the distribution does not display truncation and appears "unconstrained". However, in
CE, the intersection between the policy functions for di⁄erent values of the exogenous state
and the 45 degree line is concentrated to the left, and the distribution of the CE appears
truncated.
The probability of running into a crisis episode re￿ ects this di⁄erence in the shape of the
ergodic distribution. In the benchmark CE allocation, the unconditional probability of a
crisis is 2 percent on a quarterly basis. In the SP allocation, this probability is 1.2 percent,
despite the same average level of foreign borrowing as a share of GDP. The intuition is that,
by allocating productive resources di⁄erently, the social planner increases the value of the
collateral through an increase in relative prices and permits more borrowing in response to
24GDP is higher in the SP (0.6674) than in the CE allocation (0.6486).
27negative shocks without increasing its probability to meeting the constraint.
The overall di⁄erences in the CE and SP allocations are re￿ ected in the calculation of
the welfare gains of moving from the CE to the SP allocation. Despite the same average
borrowing, the SP achieves not only a lower probability of a crisis, but also higher welfare.
The welfare cost of ine¢ cient borrowing in our baseline production economy is 0.12 percent
of permanent tradable consumption (Table 5). And the welfare gain of moving from the
CE to the SP equilibrium in states of the worlds in which the constraint binds is about 25
percent higher than the overall cost (at 0.15 percent of permanent tradable consumption
(Table 5).25
The intuition for this result is that welfare is state dependent in this class of models
(see for instance Figure 5 for a selected number of endogenous and exogenous states).
The largest di⁄erences in the behavior of these economies arise in the states in which the
constraint is binding. And given that the economy spends most of its time outside these
states, the overall welfare di⁄erence between the two allocations is smaller than the welfare
di⁄erence in those states. It follows that the welfare di⁄erence between the CE and the
SP in normal times is even smaller than the overall di⁄erence (which includes the sudden
stop).
4.2 Robustness
In this subsection we explore the extent to which the underborrowing result found in our
benchmark economy is robust to changes in parameter values. We change the parameters
that could be critical in determining the sign of the ine¢ cient borrowing (see Benigno at
al. 2010). We focus on three key parameters: the elasticity of intratemporal substitution
that determines the sign of the sector allocation e⁄ect, the discount factor that determines
the strength of the intertemporal e⁄ect, and the variance of the shocks. Figure 7 reports
the decision rule and the ergodic distribution of B(t+1). Table 4 and 5 report the average
borrowing as a share of GDP and the probability of sudden stop, along with the welfare
gains, respectively for the benchmark case and these three other cases.26
Figure 7 (second row of panels) shows that the results are qualitatively unchanged
when we set the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable to 1.25 (i.e.,
assuming substitutability rather than complementarity), even though the underborrowing
is quantitatively smaller. This is evidenced by a smaller di⁄erences between the CE and
the SP for the same endogenous and exogenous state and an ergodic distribution of CE
25See section 3 for details on the de￿nitions and computations of these welfare gains and losses.
26In each case, the parameter is changed as reported in Table 4 and 5, without recalibrating the model.
28borrowing that remains to the right of SP one. A change in the elasticity of substitution
does not a⁄ect the marginal utility of tradable consumption, but it has an impact on
labor choices through the non-tradable relative price. When the elasticity of substitution
increases the change in the relative price in both the CE and SP allocation is smaller for a
given change in tradable consumption, and the smaller change in relative prices reduces the
labor supply e⁄ect in both the CE and SP allocation. Also the decrease in non-tradable
production and consumption that follows from labor market equilibrium (see Appendix A)
is now accompanied by an increase in tradable consumption so that the initial precautionary
saving impact on tradable consumption is dampened. With our calibration, the net outcome
of these e⁄ects is such that underborrowing is smaller compared to the benchmark case in
which goods are complement, but is not eliminated.
Table 5 also shows that, in this case, the probability of sudden stop is higher than in
the benchmark case in the CE (2.6 percent) and a much lower in the SP (0.35 percent):
on the one hand, higher substitutability implies that the relative price drop less than when
goods are complement and that helps in relaxing the constraint. On the other hand,
substitutability implies that precautionary saving is reduced and agents borrow more for a
given state increasing the probability of hitting the constraint. In the CE allocation, the
second e⁄ect dominate the ￿rst one leading to a higher probability of sudden stop. In the
SP allocation, instead, the ￿rst e⁄ect prevails reducing the probability of sudden stop. The
welfare gains in moving to the SP allocation are lower (0.0525 percent, Table 5) since the
cost of being in a sudden stop are smaller in this case.
Underborrowing increases signi￿cantly with a lower discount factor, as evidenced by
the fact that the ergodic distributions are much further apart than in the baseline case
(Figure 7, third row of panels). Lowering the discount factor to 0.91 makes agent more
impatient and reduces precautionary saving so that agents borrow more in both the CE
and SP allocations. Both the CE and the SP meet the constraint more frequently, but in
the SP allocation the unconditional probability of sudden stop is higher than in the CE
allocation (from 1.2 in the baseline case to 2.2 with higher discount factor, Table 5). This
suggests that the social planner does not necessarily need to reduce the probability of a
sudden stop relative to the CE. The reason is that the planner reduces the cost of being in
the sudden stop so that even if the welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP remains
positive (0.0351 overall, table 5), they are smaller than in the baseline case.
When we triple the variance of the shocks, underborrowing is strengthened compared to
the baseline if measured as the gap between the SP and CE ergodic distribution (Figure 7,
fourth row of panels). Once we increase the variance of the shock, there is such an increase
in the precautionary saving in both the CE and the SP so that the probability of a sudden
29stop goes to zero in both allocations. Yet, the shape of the two distributions is di⁄erent.
In the case of the CE, the borrowing distribution is truncated. In the SP is seemingly
unconstrained for the reasons explained above. In this case, however, the welfare gain of
moving from the CE to the SP is very small, as these gains accrue only in normal times.
4.3 Implications for macro-prudential policy
In the numerical analysis we have found that underborrowing is a robust feature of the
competitive allocation of our two-sector production model. We found that the welfare gains
of moving from the CE to the SP in sudden stop states are much larger than in tranquil
times and that, for the same or a higher level of borrowing, e¢ ciency is not necessarily
associated with a lower probability of crisis. What are the implications of these results for
macro-prudential policies?
First, ex post policies (i.e. policy interventions in crisis states) are more important than
ex ante ones (i.e. policy interventions during tranquil times). Indeed, in our analysis, welfare
gains are always signi￿cantly higher in sudden stop states than in other states. Note here,
however, that we are abstracting from moral hazard and time consistency considerations.
Second, these result illustrate that constrained-e¢ ciency can be achieved not only by
outright reducing borrowing and the probability of a crisis, as suggested by the existing
literature, but also by allocating productive resources more e¢ ciently in both normal and
crisis times. In the e¢ cient allocation, relative prices move in such a way that the economy is
less vulnerable to the presence of occasionally binding ￿nancial frictions. This is because, as
we mentioned earlier, our social planner tends to relax the constraint by changing relative
prices rather than quantities. Broadly speaking, this would be consistent with the "old
adage" that it is how capital is intermediated and allocated that matters, not how much
funds come into a small open economy. After all, the very presence of a ￿nancial friction
suggests that in a ￿rst best world these economies would like to borrow more not less.27
Another way to restate the point above is to note that crises are not eliminated com-
pletely by the social planner, and neither probability of a crisis nor the level of borrowing
are good policy objectives. While in general the social planner tends to reduce the uncondi-
tional probability of the crisis, there might be cases (for example when agents are impatient)
in which the unconditional probability of sudden stop chosen by the social planner is higher
than in the competitive equilibrium. More broadly, there is a trade o⁄ between volatility
and e¢ ciency in this class of models, and minimizing the probability of the crisis is not
27See Mendoza (2002) and Benigno et al, (2010) for a quantitative comparison with an unconstrained
economy.
30necessarily a good criterion to orient policy. In welfare terms, in certain cases, the gains
of higher average consumption may outweight the costs of a more volatile consumption
because of the more frequent sudden stops. In these cases, a planner that takes this trade
o⁄ into account may allocate resources in such a way to allow for higher and more volatile
consumption to achieve e¢ ciency. It follows that the appropriate policy regime depends on
the speci￿c characteristics of the economy.
Third, if the design of ex-ante policies is sensitive to the structure of the economy, the
wrong policy regime might impose costs that exceeds its intended bene￿ts. These costs
can be easily quanti￿ed in our benchmark economy by imposing a small tax on debt (a
Tobin tax) equal to 1 percent in tranquil times and zero once the crisis occurs. This simple
state-contingent policy rule implements in our model speci￿c proposals in terms of macro-
prudential policies in the related literature. Figure 8, reports the results for this experiment
(as well as for the case in which the same rule is not state-contingent) and shows that such
a rule is not robust to the speci￿cation of the model. In this case, as expected, average
borrowing as a share of GDP is unchanged and the probability of sudden stop goes to zero.
However, the Tobin tax moves the economy further away from the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation as evidenced by negative welfare gains in moving from the CE with Tobin tax
to that without. The tax forces agents to save more (moving the ergodic distribution of
debt to the right of the CE without tax), the probability of a sudden stop goes to zero,
but welfare declines. This implies that the distortion introduced by the policy intervention
is more costly in welfare terms than the bene￿t of reducing to zero the probability of the
crisis. It follows that from a policymaker￿ s perspective minimizing the probability of the
crisis or targeting the level of borrowing are not necessarily welfare-improving criteria.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we compared the competitive and the social planner allocations in a two-sector
small open production economy with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. Our
economy belongs to a class of models that can potentially match both normal ￿ uctuations
and crisis events. We ￿nd that the interaction between saving and production decisions
by agents in the competitive equilibrium lead to underborrowing. Moreover, our welfare
analysis shows that higher welfare costs arise at crises times. These results suggest that
macro-prudential policies aimed at reducing the amount of borrowing or the probability of
a crisis might be counterproductive and ex-post policies entails higher welfare gains than ex
ante ones. Our analysis suggests that the distortionary costs imposed by macro-prudential
policies may be bigger than the bene￿t of eliminating the probability of crisis events. In our
31related work (Benigno et al. 2008) we study these policy issues further by discussing the
proper choice of the instrument and proposing a Ramsey approach to the optimal policy
problem that takes into account interaction between ex ante and ex post policies.
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34Appendix A: Labor Market Equilibrium in CE allocation



















so that, among other things, the response of total hours worked to a change in precau-
tionary savings depends on labor intensities in the two sector and on whether the country is
producing more tradable output than what it consumes during the current period. Moreover
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where hT = HT






! (P N)1￿k < 1
so that unambiguously dHN=dCT > 0. The response of HT to a change in precautionary
















which implies that HT and HN always move in opposite directions after a change in pre-
cautionary savings and so that dHT=dCT < 0. Finally, dHN=dCT > 0, dHT=dCT < 0
implies that dP N=dCT > 0:
35Table 1. Model Parameters
Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods ￿ = 0:760
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion ￿ = 2
Labor supply elasticity ￿ = 2
Credit constraint parameter ￿ = 0:415
Labor share in production 1 ￿ ￿T = 1 ￿ ￿N = 0:66
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ! = 0:3526
Discount factor ￿ = 0:9717
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate i = 0:01587
Steady state productivity level AN = AT = 1
Productivity process
Persistence ￿"T = 0:5370
Volatility ￿"T = 0:0134
Average values in the ergodic distribution
Net foreign assets (or minus foreign borrowing) B = ￿0:9080
Qaurterly GDP Y = 0:6486
Qaurterly Tradable GDP Y T = 0:2544
Qaurterly Non-Tradable GDP Y N = 0:3942
36Table 4. Average foreign borrowing and probability of a sudden stop
Annual average debt in the ergodic distribution CE SP
(Percent of annual GDP)
Benchmark 35.0 35.0
￿ = 1:25 35.0 35.0
￿ = 0:91 35.0 35.0
￿"T = 0:04 32.0 33.0
￿ = 0:91 and ￿"T = 0:04 35.0 35.0
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 35.0 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 35.0 na
Quarterly unconditional sudden stop probabilities
(Percent per quarter)
Benchmark 2.00 1.20
￿ = 1:25 2.60 0.35
￿ = 0:91 2.05 2.21
￿"T = 0:04 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0:91 and ￿"T = 0:04 3.60 2.20
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 0.00 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 0.00 na
37Table 5. Welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP28
(In percent of permanent consumption)
Overall At the sudden stop
Benchmark 0.1230 0.1500
￿ = 1:25 0.0525 0.0752
￿ = 0:91 0.0351 0.0390
￿"T = 0:04 0.0013 na
￿ = 0:91 and ￿"T = 0:04 0.0430 0.0580
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) -0.00049 -0.00061
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) -0.00024 -0.00035
28For the last two experiments (￿xed Tobin tax and State-contingent Tobin tax) the welfare gain/loss is
compared to the benchmark competitive equilibrium allocation.
38Table 1. Model Parameters
Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods κ =0 .760
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion ρ =2
Labor supply elasticity δ =2
Credit constraint parameter φ =0 .415
Labor share in production 1 − αT =1− αN =0 .66
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ω =0 .3526
Discount factor β =0 .9717
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate i =0 .01587
Steady state productivity level AN = AT =1
Productivity process
Persistence ρεT =0 .5370
Volatility σεT =0 .0134
Average values in the ergodic distribution
Net foreign assets (or minus foreign borrowing) B = −0.9080
Qaurterly GDP Y =0 .6486
Qaurterly Tradable GDP Y T =0 .2544
Qaurterly Non-Tradable GDP Y N =0 .3942Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variables Model Data 1/
GDP Y=YT+YN National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, 2003 prices.
Non-Tradable GDP YN=PN*HN^0.66 National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, tertiary sectors, 2003 prices.
Tradable GDP YT=EXP(ESPILON)*HT^0.66 National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, secondary sectors, 2003 prices.
Relative Price of Non-Tradable PN=((1-omega)/omega)(CN/CT)^(kappa-1) Consumer price of services relative to consumer price of merchandise, indexes, base 2002Q2. 
Consumption Expenditure C=CT+PN*CN National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Private Consumption, 1993 prices.
Non-Tradable Consumption CN=YN National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Services plus nationally produced non-durable goods, 1993 prices.
Tradable Consumption CT=(1+i)*B(t)+YT-B(t+1) National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Imported goods plus nationally produced durable goods, 1993 prices.
Current Account CA(t)=(B(t+1)-B(t))/Y Balance of payment statistics, Current account balance to GDP.
1/ Data sources:
    National accounts are from INEGI, Banco de Información Económica (BIE), http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/bdiesi/bdie.html.
    Consumer price indexes are from Banco de Mexico (Consulta; series SP68277  and SP56335, respectively),  http://www.banxico.org.mx/sitioingles/polmoneinflacion/estadisticas/cpi/cpi.htm .
    Current account and GDP in US dollar are from the IDB Latin Macro Watch (LMW), http://www.iadb.org/Research/LatinMacroWatch/lmw.cfm.Table 3. Model Evaluation: Second Moments of the Data and the Competitive Equilibrium (CE)
St. Dev. St. Dev. Realtive to GDP First Autocorrelation Correlation with GDP
Data Data CE Data CE Data CE
GDP 2.4% 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.00 1.00
Non‐Tradable GDP 2.2% 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.97 0.97
Tradable GDP 3.4% 1.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.96 0.91
Consumption Expenditure 2.6% 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.91 0.98
Relative Price of Non‐Tradable 2.5% 1.0 2.9 0.9 0.5 0.26 0.85
Current Account (In percent of GDP) 2.1% 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.5 ‐0.61 0.98Table 4. Average foreign borrowing and probability of a sudden stop
Annual average debt in the ergodic distribution CE SP
(Percent of annual GDP)
Benchmark 35.0 35.0
κ =1 .25 35.0 35.0
β =0 .91 35.0 35.0
σεT =0 .04 32.0 33.0
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 35.0 35.0
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 35.0 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 35.0 na
Quarterly unconditional sudden stop probabilities
(Percent per quarter)
Benchmark 2.00 1.20
κ =1 .25 2.60 0.35
β =0 .91 2.05 2.21
σεT =0 .04 0.00 0.00
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 3.60 2.20
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 0.00 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 0.00 naTable 5. Welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP
(In percent of permanent consumption)
Overall At the sudden stop
Benchmark 0.1230 0.1500
κ =1 .25 0.0525 0.0752
β =0 .91 0.0351 0.0390
σεT =0 .04 0.0013 na
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 0.0430 0.0580
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 1/ -0.00049 -0.00061
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 1/ -0.00024 -0.00035
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